

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUANDA 00145 01 OF 02 051034Z

11

ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 SAM-01 OMB-01 IO-10 /080 W

----- 033912

R 041515Z FEB 75

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3238

INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUANDA 0145

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT MILI AO

SUBJECT: DANIEL CHIPENDA: PRESENT ROLE AND PROSPECTS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

1. DANIEL CHIPENDA HAS HAD SOME GAINS AND SEVERAL REVERSES SINCE HIS FIRST BREAK WITH AGOSTIHNO NETO IN MID-1973, WHEN HE BEGAN CHIPPING AWAY AT NETO'S SUPPORT AMONG MPLA FORCES IN ZAMBIA. HE REACHED HIS PEAK IN AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1974 WHEN HIS DIRECT ATTACKS ON NETO FORCED THE LATTER TO FLEE THE MPLA CONGRESS IN LUSAKA. SINCE THEN CHIPENDA HAS SLID DOWNHILL; HE WAS FORCED TO ACCEPT NETO AS MPLA PRESIDENT BY THE BRAZZAVILLE CONFERENCE OF AFRICANS HEADS OF STATE IN SEPTEMBER AND WAS READ OUT OF MPLA BY NETO IN NOVEMBER. HE SEEMINGLY ABANDONED HIS SOLDIERS, WHICH ARE HIS ONLY STRENGTH, FOR THE DUBIOUS POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ASSOCIATION WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU UNDER WHOSE WING HE SPENT THE CRUCIAL MONTHS OF SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1974. CHIPENDA REACHED A LOW POINT WHEN FNLA SIGNED THE MOMBASA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUANDA 00145 01 OF 02 051034Z

AGREEMENT WITH MPLA AND UNITA IN EARLY JANUARY, EXCLUDING HIS

EASTERN REVOLT FACTION FROM ANY ROLE IN THE INDEPENDENCE TALKS OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY, 1975 WHEN REPORTS WERE REACHING US OF DEFECTIONS BY SOME OF CHIPENDA'S FORCES AND MANY LOCAL OBSERVERS WERE BEGINNING TO COUNT CHIPENDA OUT, HE LEFT KINSHASA AND RETURNED TO HIS MEN. APPARENTLY HE RALLIED HIS FORCES AROUND HIM IN A THREE WEEK TOUR OF THEIR CAMPS INSIDE ANGOLA, THEN MADE A NOT-SO-GRAND ENTRANCE INTO LUSO ON JANUARY 23-24 (LUANDA 100).

3. CHIPENDA GAINED REKNOWN AS A SOCCER STAR AND THEN BECAME A SUCCESSFUL GUERRILLA WITH A STRONG FORCE BEHIND HIM. HE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN FORGING MPLA'S FORCES IN ZAMBIA IN THE LATE 60'S AND EARLY 70'S. HE LED THEM DURING THEIR EARLY PENETRATION DEEP INSIDE ANGOLA AND REMAINED WITH THEM DURING THEIR DEMORALIZING DEFEATS AND WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA IN 1972-74. HE WAS THE SOLDIER'S SOLDIER, FIGHTING WITH HIS MEN, NOT DIRECTING THE BATTLE FROM A SUITE IN LUSAKA OR BY CABLE FROM SOME EUROPEAN CAPITAL, THE LABELS HE SUCCESSFULLY HUNG ON NETO.

4. CHIPENDA NEVER HAD A REAL FOLLOWING INSIDE THE POPULATED AREAS OF ANGOLA AND HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH WAS ONLY IN THE NEARLY EMPTY AREAS FROM LUSO TO THE CAPRIVI STRIP AND THE REFUGEE CAMPS SCATTERED ALONG THE ZAMBIAN-ANGOLAN FRONTIER. HE IS, HOWEVER, WELL KNOWN INSIDE ANGOLA, BUT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A VITROLIC PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BY NETO'S PEOPLE IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS. WE DOUBT HE COULD SWING OVER TO HIS SIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF MPLA ADHERENTS AS LONG AS NETO REMAINS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT CHIPENDA'S EXISTENCE DEEPLY WORRIES NETO, AND THAT HE WANTS A SOLUTION FOUND TO REMOVE THIS THREAT TO HIS SUPREMACY INSIDE ANGOLA. DURING CODEL DIGGS VISIT TO AN MPLA NEIGHBORHOOD IN THE LUANDA SLUMS, THE CHILDREN WHO TURNED OUT FOR THE OCCASION CARRIED MANY MORE ANTI-CHIPENDA SIGNS THAN THOSE DENOUNCING IMPERIALISM. THE SIGNS WERE RIGHT TO THE POINT: "WANTED DEAD OR ALLIVE, DANIEL CHIPENDA."

5. AS CHIPENDA CUT HIS MPLA BRIDGES BEHIND HIM IN 1974 HE FOUND HIMSELF ISOLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN MILITARY SUPPORT THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LUANDA 00145 01 OF 02 051034Z

HAD COME VIA THE NETO CONNECTION. KAUNDA COULDN'T OR WOULDN'T HELP AND HE TURNED TO THE ENEMIES OF HIS ENEMY, HOLDEN ROBERTO AND MOBUTU, WHO RECEIVED HIM AFTER HIS DEFEAT IN BRAZZAVILLE AND APPARENTLY TOOK ON THE ROLE OF SUPPLIER AND SUPPORTER.

6. A SECRET CHIPENDA ALLIANCE WITH ROBERTO HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN RUMORED (KINSHASA 731) AND MAKES SOME SENSE. IT PUTS A RESPECTABLE MILITARY FORCE IN THE REAR OF UNITA AND MPLA AND GIVES

FNLA AN ALLY IN EASTERN ANGOLA WHERE IT HAS NEVER HAD ANY REAL SUCCESS. A NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT CHIPENDA PROVIDES MOBUTU AND ROBERTO WITH AN ALTERNATIVE LEADER FROM MPLA SHOULD NETO FALTER, WHEREAS A CHIPENDA PUBLICLY ALLIED OR INTEGRATED WITH FNLA PROVIDES ROBERTO WITH THE SAME MILITARY SUPPORT BUT NO POLITICAL BENEFITS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 LUANDA 00145 02 OF 02 050944Z

20

ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 SAM-01 OMB-01 IO-10 /080 W

----- 033581

R 041515Z FEB 75

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3239

INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUANDA 0145

7. CHIPENDA IS A VIABLE POLITICO/MILITARY FORCE AS LONG AS HIS TROOPS REMAIN WITH HIM. HIS 2,000 TO 3,000 TRAINED VETERANS OF YEARS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE ARE EQUAL TO OR BETTER THAN THE TRAINED FORCES AVAILABLE TO NETO OR SAVIMBI AT THE PRESENT TIME.

8. CHIPENDA PRESENTS ONE OF THE FIRST MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE. ONLY THE NETO PEOPLE ARE CALLING FOR HIS DESTRUCTION. SAVIMBI HAS SAID THAT CHIPENDA IS A POWER THAT MUST BE CONFRONTED IN A POLITICAL WAY I.E., BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN EXCLUDED. A PORTUGUESE MILITARY SPOKESMAN ECHOED THIS SENTIMENT BY SAYING THAT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MUST ACT ON

CHIPENDA BECAUSE THE PORTUGUESE WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. FNLA
HAS BEEN SILENT ON THE SUBJECT IN LUANDA BUT THEY DO
PROVIDE GUARDS FOR CHIPENDA'S OFFICE HERE. KINSHASA 731
INDICATES THAT MOBUTU AND ROBERTO ARE BEHIND CHIPENDA. HE
THUS BECOMES A TEST CASE OF THE INTENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE DIFFICULT ISSUES PEACEFULLY.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LUANDA 00145 02 OF 02 050944Z

KILLORAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL LEADERS, LIBERATION FRONTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975LUANDA00145
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750041-1048
From: LUANDA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750274/aaaacpad.tel
Line Count: 181
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DANIEL CHIPENDA: PRESENT ROLE AND PROSPECTS CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY
TAGS: PINS, MILI, AO, MPLA, (CHIPENDA, DANIEL), (NETO, AGOSTINHO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006